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The Impact of Amnesty on Labor Market Outcomes: 
A Panel Study Using the Legalized Population Survey 
 
This paper tests whether amnesty, a provision of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control 
Act (IRCA), affected the labor market outcomes of the legalized population. Using the 
Legalized Population Survey (LPS) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) 
from 1987-1992, a quasi-experimental framework is developed to assess the differential 
impact of amnesty on the legalized population relative to a comparison group. After the 
implementation of the amnesty program, employment fell and unemployment rose for newly 
legalized men relative to the comparison group of already legal U.S. residents. For women, 
employment also fell and transitions out of the workforce increased among the newly 
legalized population. Increasing returns to skill, as captured by English proficiency, only 
played an important role in explaining the employment of newly legalized women. Finally, 
newly legalized men and women enjoyed higher wage growth rates than their working native 
counterparts, perhaps owing to their comparatively growing returns to U.S. educational 
attainment over this period. 
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1.   Introduction 
  Undocumented immigration has been a long-standing component of the U.S. labor market 
as most illegal immigrants enter the U.S. in search of work.  How to address the current record-
high number of unauthorized workers within our borders has been the topic of heated debate.  
Past efforts to moderate inflows by increasing border enforcement, imposing fines on employers, 
and granting amnesty to long-term undocumented residents can be used to guide future 
immigration reform.  While a number of studies have examined the effect of employer sanctions 
(Bansak and Raphael 2001, Bansak 2005, Cobb-Clark et al.1995) and border enforcement 
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 2007, Orrenius and Zavodny  2003), only a handful have 
examined the impact of amnesty on the newly legalized (Kassoudji  and Cobb-Clark 2002, 2004, 
Kaushal 2006).  Despite recent debates regarding the usage of a generalized or partial amnesty as 
a means to address current immigration concerns, the impact of past amnesty programs on labor 
market outcomes post-legalization has not been widely documented and the analysis has been 
limited to men. 
  In this paper, we examine whether amnesty, a provision of the 1986 Immigration Reform 
and Control Act (IRCA), affected the labor market outcomes and wages of the legalized 
population by gender.  The analysis is carried out by gender to address male and female 
differences in labor supply and earnings.  Using the Legalized Population Survey (LPS) and a 
comparison sample from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLYS79), a quasi-
experimental framework is developed to assess the differential impact of amnesty on the legalized 
population relative to a comparison group.  
  The analysis is of interest as legal status can have a direct effect on employment 
opportunities (employer-employee matches) if mobility is limited for undocumented workers due 
to discrimination, fear of apprehension, or low returns to human capital (Calavita 1992).     2
Specifically, if undocumented workers feel that they have limited job alternatives, they may 
exhibit a strong attachment to their employers.  Furthermore, this attachment may enhance the 
monopsonistic power (or bargaining power) of employers who, in turn, would pay wages below 
the marginal revenue product (Black 1995, Raphael and Riker 1999, Pagan and Davila 1996).  As 
such, legalization could enhance labor market efficiency and raise wages by improving mobility 
and the quality of job matches (Black 1995, Raphael and Riker 1999).   
  Our results reveal differences in the labor market outcomes and wages for the newly 
legalized compared to native workers by gender.  To begin, employment rates fell and 
unemployment rose for the newly legalized male population relative to a comparison group of 
natives following legalization.  Likewise, employment rates fell while transitions out of the 
workforce increased for newly legalized female immigrants when compared to their Hispanic 
native counterparts.  An examination of the determinants of the labor market status before and 
after amnesty suggests that increasing returns to English proficiency played an important role in 
women’s labor force status.  Specifically, English proficient women were more likely to be 
employed and less likely to be out of the labor force after amnesty, whereas English proficiency 
was not a significant determinant for women before legalization.  However, returns to skill played 
a minimal role as determinants of the labor market status of men before and after amnesty.   
Finally, newly legalized men and women enjoyed higher wage growth rates than their working 
native counterparts, possibly as a by-product of their comparatively growing returns to U.S. 
educational attainment over this period.  In sum, amnesty may have improved labor market 
efficiency by increasing transparency, job mobility and the quality of job matches for some, while 
also reducing the labor market participation of others.   
2.   The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)   3
  After an intense fifteen-year debate, IRCA was passed in 1986 and was the first major 
immigration legislation in over two decades.  The intent of IRCA was to stem the flow of 
increased illegal immigration into the United States.  Border apprehensions of illegal immigrants 
had risen from 250,000 in 1970 to 1.6 million in 1986 and advocates of immigration control 
expressed concern over problems associated with illegal immigration.  Specifically, IRCA 
adopted three strategies to accomplish its goals: 1) increased INS resources for border 
enforcement, 2) introduced employer sanctions for knowingly hiring undocumented workers and 
3) offered two amnesty programs to legalize illegal resident aliens. 
The two amnesty programs together enabled 2.7 million undocumented immigrants to 
acquire legal permanent resident (LPR) status in the United States.  It is estimated that most 
undocumented migrants applied for legalization (Warren 1995, Hoefer 1991).  The process of 
legalization lasted an average of two years –more than 95 percent of legalizations took place 
between 1989 and 1991, and had a high rate of success –about 9 out of 10 applicants obtained 
LPR status (Rytina 2002). 
The first and larger program offered amnesty under section 245A of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) to 1.6 million illegal aliens who demonstrated continuous residency since 
January 1, 1982 (nearly 5 years).
1   The second program, known as the Special Agricultural 
Worker (SAW) program, was intended to grant amnesty to illegal workers with ties to agriculture.  
This program granted LPR status to 1.1 million undocumented workers with 90 days of seasonal 
agriculture experience in the U.S. between May 1985 and May 1986.
2  Legalization for the first 
                                                 
1 Between May 5, 1987 and May 4, 1988, 1.8 million persons applied for amnesty under section 245A; 1.7 million 
were granted temporary resident alien status and about 1.6 million were ultimately granted lawful permanent resident 
status (Department of Labor, 1996). 
2 According to Martin and Taylor (1990), program applications for the SAW program were nearly four times the 
expected number and the SAW program may have attracted new immigration into the United States and increased the 
immigrant supply of labor.   4
group – considered long-term illegal residents – was intended to bring undocumented workers 
“out of the shadows” and improve their wages and working conditions by reducing workplace 
vulnerabilities (Kassoudji  and Cobb-Clark 2002, 2004).  This group was followed and surveyed 
through the longitudinal Legalized Population Survey and the question as to how legalization 
actually changed their labor market outcomes – as captured by their employment status and 
wages– is the focus of this paper. 
3.   Theoretical Predictions Regarding the Labor Market Impact of the Amnesty  
  A number of studies suggest that legalization or naturalization results in better labor 
market outcomes for immigrants (Kaushal 2006, Bratsburg et al., 2002, Kossoudji and Cobb-
Clark 2002, 2004; Rivera-Batiz, 1999).  Specifically relevant to our study is the work by 
Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002), who also work with the LPS and a comparison sample from 
the NLSY79 to show that following legalization, English proficiency and education enhanced 
wage growth for male immigrants.  As such, they conclude that their results show strong evidence 
that IRCA’s amnesty provisions improved the labor market opportunities of legalized workers.  
While ground-breaking, their analysis of the impact of IRCA’s general amnesty is focused on the 
determinants of male wages before and after legalization without further consideration to the 
impact of legalization on their labor force status or on the labor market outcomes of women.  In 
particular, their study does not discuss the fact that English proficiency and educational 
attainment are characteristics often held by a minority of the legalized population.  Consequently, 
the possibility exists that, while skilled workers with strong ties to the labor market fared better, 
immigrants with limited skills were more likely to drop out of the labor market or enter the pool 
of unemployed following their legalization.         5
  To guide our empirical work, it is helpful to sketch out a simple conceptual framework of 
the relationships between amnesty, labor force status, and wages.  Suppose that legalization is 
likely to raise the returns to skill and, via greater mobility, raise market wages for legalized 
immigrants.  According to the neoclassical model of labor-leisure choice (Killingsworth 1983), 
legalization can affect labor supply decisions of immigrants differently depending on their skill 
level and preferences.  A variety of outcomes may then be observed.  We explain the factors 
affecting the labor supply response of immigrants to amnesty below.  Specifically, we distinguish 
three scenarios: 
1.  Staying employed but earning higher wages (Figure A): Among continuously employed 
skilled migrants, legalization may simply translate into higher hourly wages.  Increased labor 
market opportunities may induce some of these migrants to either move to better paying jobs or to 
negotiate a higher pay with the same employers once legalized.  By bringing workers ‘out of the 
shadows’, legalization may also increase the reservation wage of unskilled migrants previously 
lacking any bargaining power owing to their undocumented status.  If the lack of the appropriate 
visa status was the cause for the low-paid jobs held by these workers, unskilled workers may also 
enjoy a wage increase in their same or in new jobs.   
2.  Exiting employment (Figure B): By raising the returns to skill and by qualifying for 
unemployment insurance, legalization may raise the reservation wage of skilled workers, who 
may choose to search longer for a good job match.  In that event, newly legalized skilled 
immigrants may be more likely to be observed exiting employment at a particular point in time 
than before legalization.  Eligibility for unemployment insurance while not working –a source of 
non-labor income– may create a spike in the budget constraint at zero hours of work, raising 
reservation wages above their pre-legalization level, which means that a return to work is only   6
possible if the worker finds a higher-paying job (Figure B – left panel).  As noted by Borjas and 
Tienda (1993), newly legalized unskilled workers employed in low-paid jobs are more likely to 
become eligible for public assistance, which may raise their reservation wages.  Similar to 
unemployment insurance, the receipt of social services –another source of non-labor income– 
may result in a pure income effect that shifts the budget constraint outward (up to the maximum 
need-based income level – a kinked budget constraint under AFDC) and reduces the employment 
likelihood of newly legalized unskilled immigrants (Figure B – right panel).  Furthermore, such 
an income effect could also be explained by the existence of families who previously had dual 
earners.  Spouses’ higher labor income may raise the reservation wages of secondary household 
earners and induce them to step out of the labor market. 
3.  Entering employment (Figure C):  Higher wages resulting from legalization and the 
opening of new job opportunities may also induce some previously non-working immigrants to 
become employed.  Specifically, an increase in market wages would raise the slope of the budget 
constraint, which in turn would attract some individuals with steep indifference curves into work.   
 Predictions:  While the overall flow into and out of employment is an empirical question, 
the number of newly legalized immigrants exiting non-employment and entering into employment 
is likely to be small since undocumented immigrants typically have higher employment rates than 
their documented counterparts or natives (Borjas and Tienda 1993).  Therefore, the flows out of 
employment are likely to be larger than the flows into employment.  Additionally, the reasons 
behind the observed employment outflows may differ by skill level and gender.  Given the 
comparatively higher skill level of immigrant men relative to women,
3 we would expect a higher 
fraction of men to be leaving their employers in search for a better job –perhaps while receiving   7
unemployment insurance, whereas a larger percentage of newly legalized immigrant women 
would be exiting the workforce and qualifying for public assistance.
4  Finally, for men and 
women employed pre and post legalization, the theory predicts an increase in wages as a by-
product of the higher mobility and returns to their skills following legalization.     
4.   Data  
This paper uses data from two longitudinal surveys in order to examine the impact of 
legalization under IRCA’s main amnesty program on the employment outcomes and wages of 
newly legalized immigrants while controlling for macroeconomic conditions in a quasi-
experimental design that largely follows that of Cobb-Clark and Kassoudji (2002).  Authorized by 
Congress, the Legalized Population Survey (LPS) is the only nationally representative dataset 
designed to analyze the impact of IRCA’s main amnesty program on the legalized population.  
Participants were randomly selected and interviewed in 1989 and two-thirds were interviewed 
again in 1992 after most had spent more than a decade of continuous residency in the United 
States.  The first survey (LPS1) collected information from 6,193 individuals who had applied for 
temporary residence status by January 31, 1989.  In this survey, respondents were asked to 
describe their employment status in the week before the amnesty application was filed.  In the 
follow-up survey (LPS2), approximately 4 years later, about 4,012 LPS1 respondents who were 
granted lawful permanent residence by 1992 were re-interviewed.
5  These two surveys together 
                                                                                                                                                               
3 On average, men in the LPS have 8.4 years of education, 7.3 years of work experience and 51 percent of them are 
proficient in English.  In contrast, their female counterparts have, on average, 8.1 years of education, 6.9 years of 
work experience and only 40 percent of them can read and speak English fluently.   
4 Indeed, authors’ tabulations using the LPS2 data show that that a higher percentage of newly legalized immigrant 
women receive school lunches, food donations, Aid for Families with Dependent Children, child support and food 
stamps compared to their male counterparts.  However, a higher percentage of newly legalized immigrant men 
receive unemployment insurance and workers compensation than as compared to newly legalized immigrant women.    
5 Only 2/3rds of the LPS1 sample was re-interviewed in the LPS2 for several reasons.  The LPS2 excluded those who 
those whose age or immigration status disqualified them from the earlier survey, as well as LPS1- 
eligibles who had died, permanently left the contiguous 48 states, or failed to receive lawful permanent residence by   8
form the longitudinal LPS panel, which we utilize for this study.  It should be noted that the LPS 
is not representative of all amnesty recipients, but of long-term illegal aliens who were able to 
document continuous unauthorized residency in the U.S. since 1982 and who were able to 
successfully take advantage of IRCA’s main amnesty program to adjust their legal status.   
Nonetheless, the longitudinal nature of the dataset makes it highly valuable when examining the 
potential impact of legalization on the employment outcomes of affected immigrants as it tracks 
respondents over the period surrounding their change in legal status.     
To investigate whether IRCA affected the labor market outcomes and wages of those who 
became legalized due to the amnesty provisions, we chose a comparison group similar to the 
target group but unaffected by the amnesty program.  The ideal comparison group would consist 
of a randomly selected group of undocumented immigrants similar to the target group, but 
ineligible for, and unaffected by, the generalized amnesty.  However, this is not possible due to 
the fact that IRCA was a broad-based legislation that affected undocumented immigrants who 
obtained legal status as well as those who did not (e.g. Bean et al. 1988, Bansak and Raphael 
2001).  Therefore, following Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002), we work with a sample of 
Hispanic natives from the 1979 National Survey of Youth (NLSY79) of similar age and work 
experience.
6  While the labor market determinants of undocumented immigrants are likely to 
differ from those of natives, the use of panel data allows us to compare difference-in-differences 
and take into account divergences between these two groups at any point in time.
7  The NLSY79 
is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 civilian young men and women aged 14-21 as of 
                                                                                                                                                               
January 1992.  Furthermore, an additional 691 LPS1 respondents were excluded due to resource limitations and these 
individuals were randomly selected for exclusion. (http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/LPS/LPSreadme.pdf). 
6 We restrict our sample to only natives due to the lack of information on the legal status of immigrants in the 
NLSY79. 
7 Furthermore, Bailey (2002) finds that the effect of amnesty on natives is not likely to be significant.   9
December 31, 1978.  This cohort was interviewed annually from 1979 through 1994.
8  We work 
with a sample of 1,200 Hispanic natives from the 1987 and 1992 rounds of the NLSY79 of 
similar age, family size, and work experience.   
Using both surveys, we compare by gender the labor market outcomes before and after the 
legalization of the LPS sample to those of an already legal population of similar ethnicity, age, 
and labor market experience in the NLSY79.  The usage of a comparison sample allows us to 
separate the impact of business and life-cycle effects concurrent with IRCA’s amnesty program 
that may have affected the observed employment and unemployment outcomes of legalized 
immigrants.  Notably, the economy experienced a recession between July 1990 and March 1991 
which worsened employment prospects for those in both surveys.   
  Table A in the appendix provides a description of the variables used in our analysis.  A 
number of variables are only relevant for the LPS sample, such as U.S. education or English 
proficiency since both equal 1 for all respondents in the NLSY79 sample.  Table B and Table C 
further show the male and female sample means in the LPS and NLSY79 samples before and 
after legalization, i.e. in 1987 and in 1992.  An initial comparison of the LPS and NLSY79 
respondents reveals a number of similarities.  Because of the sample restrictions, respondents in 
the LPS and NLSY79 are close in age, family size (which fluctuates between 3 and 4 members in 
1987) and display similar years of work experience (i.e. between 7 and 7.5 years of experience in 
1987) before the legalization of the LPS sample.  Additionally, more than half of all respondents 
in both samples of men and women are of Mexican origin.  Lastly, both samples are 
geographically concentrated in the West (largest share for both samples) and South with a 
minority residing in the North East and North Central regions of the United States.  
                                                 
8 Starting in 1994, the interviews were conducted biennially.     10
  Among working respondents, the LPS sample earns somewhat less than the NSLY79 
sample, although both earn relatively low real wages (between $6 and $9 in 1992 dollars).   
Likewise, both LPS men and their Hispanic counterparts in the NLSY79 are relatively 
concentrated in manufacturing, trade and construction.  However, the industry of working LPS 
women and Hispanic women in the NLSY79 show greater differences.  Specifically, LPS women 
work predominantly in manufacturing, personal services and trade, whereas Hispanic women in 
the NLSY79 are primarily employed in professional related services, finance, insurance, real 
estate and manufacturing.  These figures suggest that, owing to the often informal nature of 
personal service employment, especially newly legalized women may be less likely to qualify for 
unemployment insurance than their Hispanic NLSY79 counterparts.   
5.   Empirical Methodology 
5.1.   The Impact of IRCA on the Labor Force Status of the Legalized Population 
The objective of our study is to examine the impact of IRCA’s main amnesty program on 
the economic well-being of its beneficiaries as captured by changes in their labor market status 
and wages.  With that purpose in mind, we use a difference-in-difference approach that relies on 
the usage on the identification of a target group –in our case newly legalized immigrants in the 
LPS– and a comparison group from the NLSY79.  Assuming that unmeasured factors 
contemporaneous to IRCA have the same impact on the labor market outcomes of the legalized 
population (LPS) and Hispanic population from the NLSY79, an estimate of the relative labor 
market effects of IRCA’s main amnesty program is given by: 
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where Lj
i, is the labor market outcome for group j in time period i (A = post-legalization or 1992, 
B=pre-legalization or 1987).       11
  The double difference estimate in equation (1) is based on the assumption that workers in 
the LPS and NLSY79 are similar (aside from differing in their initial legal status).  However, it 
may be possible that these two groups of workers vary in some respects.  For example, 
educational attainment and other background characteristics may differ across these two groups.  
An alternative estimate that adjusts for differences in observable and unobservable individual 
level characteristics can be derived from the following regression equation for the pooled sample 
of legalized and already legal workers: 
  ) 87 * 87 ( ) 1 (
'
4 3 2 1 0 it t i t i it X Post LPS Post LPS L P                          (2) 
where  stands for the normal cumulative density function.  The i indexes individuals and t 
indexes time; equation (2) was estimated as a pooled probit model with clustering at the 
individual level.
9  L represents the labor market outcome in question, LPS  is a dummy variable 
indicating that the worker belongs to the LPS sample and  87 Post  is a dummy variable indicating 
that the observation corresponds to the post-legalization period.  The marginal effect of the 
interaction term gives the extent to which labor market outcomes for legalized workers differs 
from the comparable change experienced by legal workers before and after legalization and after 
controlling for observable personal characteristics included in  X .  Additionally, the vector  X  
includes interaction terms between the  87 Post dummy and education and experience to allow for 
changes over time in the returns to education and experience (Freeman and Katz 1994).  As a 
result, the estimate from the  87 *Post LPS  interaction term is directly comparable to the 
unadjusted double-difference in equation (1), with the advantage that it also accounts for observed 
and unobserved individual level characteristics.      
                                                 
9 We also estimated equation (2) as a random-effects probit and a fixed-effects logit.  While the results from the 
probit were qualitatively similar and are available upon request, the fixed-effects logit dropped variables of key 
interest, such as  LPSit and Post87it   12
  The preceding analysis tells us about the potential impact of legalization on the labor 
market outcomes of legalized immigrants.  However, it does not reveal the factors driving such an 
impact.  One way to understand the determinants of amnesty’s effect on the labor market 
outcomes of the newly legalized is to estimate the probability of being in a labor market state 
before and after amnesty for each group of men and women and then compare changes in the 
coefficients of key determinants of respondents’ labor force status.  With that purpose, we 
estimate probit models of the likelihood of being employed, unemployed or not in the labor force 
separately by gender, group (LPS and NLSY79), and year (1987 and 1992) to then focus on the 
potential for changes in return to skills –as captured by English proficiency, any U.S. education, 
schooling and years of work experience– over this period of time.   
5.2.   The Impact of IRCA on the Wage Growth of the Legalized Population   
  As reflected by Figures B and C in the appendix, legalization may have affected the labor 
force status held by newly legalized immigrants.  This is true if legalization raised the returns to 
skill and induced some legalized immigrants to step into the workforce (Figure C).  Alternatively, 
higher reservation wages following qualification for social services and unemployment insurance 
may have motivated some working migrants to search for better job opportunities or to step out of 
the workforce (Figure B).  However, the possibility also exists that some immigrants may have 
remained employed in both periods and may have seen a change in their wages (Figure A).  In an 
earlier study, Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) examine the impact of legalization on the wages 
earned by immigrants in the LPS.  They estimate wage regressions in different time periods using 
a working sample from the LPS and a comparison sample from the NLSY79.  After examining 
the role played by wage determinants over time, they conclude that wage determinants changed 
after amnesty for the legalized population but not for the comparison group.  Nevertheless,   13
because they do not exploit the longitudinal nature of the LPS, their analysis cannot gauge the 
impact of amnesty on individual wage growth.  Furthermore, their focus is on working men.  We 
thus expand their analysis using separate panels of employed men and women.  We first estimate 
the relative wage impact of IRCA’s main amnesty program by computing: 
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where wj
i is the log hourly wage earned by respondents in each of the two samples pre and post 
legalization of the LPS.   
To account for individual level characteristics, we also estimated the expected wage 
growth experienced by immigrant and native men and women as: 

'
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where the vector Z   includes the respondents’ personal characteristics used in modeling their 
labor force statuses (i.e. the vector X in equation (2)), as well as information on the industry 
where respondents were employed.
10  
  As with the previous analysis of changes in labor force status, we also examine the 
determinants of changes in wage growth for the LPS and the Hispanic NLSY79 samples before 
and after legalization of the LPS group.  To that end, we estimate models of the log real hourly 
wages earned by men and women in the LPS and NLSY79 samples in 1987 and in 1992, 
conditional on being employed in both periods.  We then track changes in the coefficients of male 
and female respondents’ skill proxies within each sample to assess the role of returns to skill as 
                                                 
10 We also estimated a Heckman selection type model where we examine the wage growth experienced by the 
legalized population relative to their legal counterparts while accounting for the ongoing selection into employment.  
Because the results were similar and the Heckman model involves identification restrictions, we report the results 
using the simpler OLS specification.  However, results using the Heckman model are available from the authors upon 
request.     14
determinants of the wage growth experienced by LPS men and women before and after 
legalization.     
6.   Empirical Results    
6.1.   The Impact of IRCA on the Labor Force Status of the Legalized Population 
  Table 1 presents unadjusted estimates of the amnesty effect on the legalized population in 
the period surrounding the implementation of IRCA.  For the years 1987 (pre-IRCA) and 1992 
(post-IRCA), tabulations are presented for three separate labor market outcomes according to 
whether the individual is in the legalized sample (LPS) or in the already legal sample (NLSY79).  
Recall that this approach provides us with the difference-in-difference estimator of the “amnesty 
effect” described in equation (1).   
  According to the figures in Panel A and D from Table 1, the passage of IRCA was 
followed by statistically significant 6.7 and 7.9 percentage point reductions in the share of 
employed male and female immigrants, respectively.  By contrast, the employment rate of men 
and women in the NLSY79 sample remained stable between 1987 and 1992 (dropping by 2.1 
percentage points and falling by half a percentage point, correspondingly).  Across the target and 
control groups, the relative decline in employment turns out to be statistically significant at the 10 
percent level for both men and women, for whom the difference-in-difference estimate is 4.6 and 
7.4 percentage points, respectively.  As such, it appears that amnesty resulted in a fall in 
employment for the legalized population relative to their already legal counterparts.   
  Regarding unemployment, shown in Panel B and Panel E from Table 1, changes and 
relative changes are only significant for men.  The share of unemployed rose by 5 percentage 
points for male immigrants and by 2.4 percentage points for native men over the time period 
under consideration.  For women, these increases were 2.2 and 1.4 percentage points,   15
respectively.  Since the difference in unemployment rates pre and post between the LPS and the 
NLSY79 samples is greater for men (2.6 versus 0.8 percentage points), it is not surprising that the 
difference-in-difference estimate is significant only for men.  That is, unemployment increased by 
2.6 percentage points more for the male LPS sample following legalization relative to the male 
NLSY79 sample.      
  Lastly, the figures in Panels C and F reveal changes and relative changes in the share of 
the legalized population dropping out of the workforce.  The share of the male legalized 
population dropping out of the workforce increased for both LPS and Hispanic men in the 
NLSY79.  Therefore, the difference-in-difference estimate does not turn out to be significantly 
different from zero for men.  The share of women “not in the labor force” rose by 5.7 percentage 
points for the LPS sample, while it declined by 0.9 percentage points among Hispanic natives.  As 
such, we find that the difference-in-difference estimator is positive and significant.  In particular, 
the share of legalized women dropping out of the workforce grew by 6.6 percentage points 
relative to their already legal counterpart over the period surrounding the implementation of 
IRCA’s amnesty provisions. 
  Altogether, the figures from Table 1 suggest that the amnesty program seems to have 
reduced employment and raised unemployment rates among the newly-legalized male population.  
For women, amnesty resulted in a lower employment rate and a greater propensity to be out of the 
labor force.  Nonetheless, these results assume that immigrants in the LPS sample and their native 
counterparts in the NLSY79 are similar with respect to a myriad of personal characteristics.   
Therefore, we next estimate equation (2) for each of the three labor market outcomes in 
consideration to assess whether the amnesty effects are still observed after we account for 
individual observable and unobservable characteristics.  Additionally, equation (2) includes   16
interaction terms between education, experience and the dummy variable indicating a post-
legalization observation to allow for changes over time in the returns to education and experience.   
  Tables 2A and 2B present the coefficients and marginal effects from the probit models 
estimated for each of the labor market outcomes being examined for men and women, 
correspondingly.  Starting with the figures in Table 2A, the coefficients on the LPS term suggest 
that the legalized male population is more likely than their already legal counterparts to be 
employed and less likely to be unemployed or out of the workforce in the pre-legalization period 
(1987).  This result is not surprising as the labor force participation rate is typically high and 
unemployment low for undocumented immigrants since an improved labor market experience is 
the predominant reason for migration decisions (Borjas and Tienda 1993).  Therefore, just as 
suggested by the figures in Table 1, the amnesty program appears to have reduced the 
employment likelihood of legalized male immigrants by 6.1 percentage points while also raising 
their unemployment likelihood by 5.7 percentage points.   
  Turning to women, the figures in Table 2B reveal that the legalized female population is 
more likely than their already legal counterparts to be employed and less likely to be unemployed 
or out of the workforce in the pre-period.  However, once we account for individual observed and 
unobserved characteristics, control for the experiences of native women, as well as for changing 
returns to education and experience over the period under consideration, the amnesty program 
seems to have reduced the employment likelihood of legalized women by 10.7 percentage points 
and raised their likelihood of stepping out of the workforce by 8.0 percentage points.   
  Overall, the figures in Tables 1 through 2B provide insight into the likely impact that 
legalization may have had on the employment outcomes of the newly legalized immigrant   17
population relative to those of their already legal counterparts.  However, they do not show direct 
evidence of changing returns to skill as motivated by our conceptual framework.   
  In order to explore the possibilities of changing returns to skill, we estimate probit models 
of the likelihood of being employed, unemployed, or not in the labor force separately by gender, 
group (LPS or NLSY79), and year.  What can explain who is more likely to be employed, 
unemployed, and not in the labor force before and after IRCA’s amnesty provisions were 
implemented?  We first address this question for women.  As shown in Table 3B, LPS women 
enjoyed small returns to their educational attainment before legalization, whereas their Hispanic 
native counterparts experienced sizable benefits to additional schooling.  For each year of 
schooling, LPS women were 1.2 percentage points more likely to be employed, whereas their 
NLSY79 counterparts experienced a 3.7 percentage point higher probability of being employed 
for each year of education.     
  Following their legalization, LPS women became highly rewarded employment-wise for 
the ability to speak English.  Specifically, immigrant women proficient in English were about 10 
percentage points more likely to be employed and 11 percentage points less likely to be out of the 
labor force than their counterparts lacking those English skills.  Thus, legalization appears to have 
reinforced the work attachment of English proficient female workers.  Native Hispanic women, 
however, enjoyed increased returns to educational attainment and work experience.  Therefore, as 
often noted in the migration literature, education and experience are clear signs of human capital 
for natives, but not for their immigrant counterparts. 
  As their female counterparts, native Hispanic men enjoyed increasing returns to their 
educational attainment over the 1987-1992 period (see Table 3A).  However, skill (as captured by 
education, experience or English proficiency) has no explanatory power in predicting the   18
employment status of immigrant men before or after their legalization.  This finding further 
corroborates the fact that education and work experience are rewarded differently for natives and 
immigrants.  It is interesting that English proficiency is not as important in explaining the 
employment of men as compared to women, which may be due to a variety of factors.  In 
particular, immigrant men are more likely to be at work than immigrant women.  As such, English 
proficiency may not play as much of a crucial role in explaining male (relative to female) 
employment.  Additionally, immigrant women are more likely than their immigrant male 
counterparts to occupy service sector jobs, i.e. personal service industry, where English 
proficiency may be highly valued.          
6.2.   The Impact of IRCA on the Wage Growth of the Legalized Population 
  As depicted in Figure A, legalization may not have affected the employment status of 
some migrants.  Yet, these individuals may have still seen an improvement in earnings and 
experienced a move to a higher indifference curve.  To examine the validity of this hypothesis, we 
first compute a difference-in-difference estimate of the wage growth in the legalized and already 
legal samples between 1987 and 1992 in Table 4.  According to these preliminary estimates, male 
and female hourly wages of the legalized population sample grew by a statistically significant 6.7 
and 10.0 percent, respectively, during the period under consideration.  In contrast, the hourly 
wages of male and female natives seem to have grown from 1987 to 1992 by a non-statistically 
different from zero 4.2 and 4.8 percent, respectively.  Yet, the difference-in-difference estimates 
or relative increases in hourly wages are not statistically significant for either men or women.   
  While informative, the figures in Table 4 fail to account for a wide variety of individual 
level characteristics possibly affecting workers’ earnings.  Therefore, in Table 5, we display the 
results from estimating models of wage growth experienced by male and female LPS and   19
NLSY79 workers employed in 1987 and in 1992.  Did men and women in the LPS sample enjoy a 
greater wage growth than their comparison counterparts post legalization?  According to the 
estimates in Table 5, wages grew 10.4 percent more for the LPS male respondents than for their 
male counterparts in the NLSY79 between 1987 and 1992.  This figure implies an annualized 
growth rate of approximately 2 percent.  Among women, this growth rate averaged 18.9 percent 
or about 4 percent per year.  Consequently, the figures from Table 5 substantiate the transition 
depicted in Figure A, suggesting that immigrants employed both pre and post legalization 
improved their well-being by reaching higher indifference curves.   
  What factors may lay behind the greater relative wage growth experienced by the LPS 
men and women?  To address this question, Table 6 presents the coefficients on the skill variables 
(English proficiency, U.S. education, years of education, and years of experience) from log wage 
models for men and women before and after amnesty was implemented.  After legalization, our 
results suggest that LPS men and women were more highly compensated for their educational 
attainment.  However, language proficiency lost value after legalization.  Since the vast majority 
of continuously employed immigrants in our sample entered the U.S. around the same time, 
English proficiency –a by-product of the duration of their migration spells– is likely to display 
limited variability and, consequently, play a lesser role in explaining differences in wage growth.  
Alternatively, English proficiency may already help explain their employment (as in the case of 
LPS women following legalization in Table 3B), limiting the importance of language in its role of 
explaining wage growth. Finally, it is worth noting that while the returns to work experience 
appeared to have increased for LPS men, they remained non-statistically different from zero for 
their female counterparts.   
  In the meantime, work experience lost value and the returns to schooling slightly declined   20
among Hispanic native men and women between 1987 and 1992.  As such, while LPS men and 
women enjoyed increasing returns to their educational attainment after legalization, their Hispanic 
native counterparts appear to have experienced a slight decrease in their rewards to additional 
schooling.  Likewise, while LPS men were enjoying increasing returns to their work experience 
after legalization, the returns to work experience seemed to vanish for their Hispanic native 
counterparts by 1992.   
7.  Summary and Conclusions    
  Undocumented immigration continues to be the focus of heated debate and amnesty 
remains as one of the policy options to reduce the large number of unauthorized immigrants in the 
U.S.  How would such a policy affect the labor market outcomes of undocumented immigrants?  
Would legalized migrants face an easier time coming ‘out of the shadows’, resulting in greater job 
mobility?  Does legalization raise reservation wages (via a higher return to skill for skilled 
workers or via eligibility for public services for unskilled workers) and result in lower labor 
market participation?  Which factors are more likely to be driving these trends?  Finally, does 
legalization raise the wages earned by immigrants employed after legalization occurred?   
  We address these questions with an analysis of the impact that amnesty, a provision of the 
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), had on the labor market outcomes and wages 
of the legalized population.  We use data from the Legalized Population Survey (LPS) and the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) from 1987-1992 to develop a quasi-
experimental framework to assess the differential impact of amnesty on the legalized population 
relative to a comparison group of U.S. natives.  After taking into account any individual level 
heterogeneity, we find that employment rates fell and unemployment rates rose for the immigrant 
male population relative to the comparison group post legalization.  Among women, legalization   21
appears to have reduced employment rates and increased transitions out of the workforce as 
compared to similar natives.  As such, legalization seems to have diminished the employment, 
unemployment, and out-of-the-workforce disparities between undocumented immigrants and 
similar U.S. natives.  Furthermore, legalization likely enhanced the wage growth of newly 
legalized men and women. 
  Our findings also suggest that legalization had a differential impact on the labor supply 
decisions and wages of immigrants according to their skill level and gender.  Legalization seems 
to have raised the employment-returns to English proficiency, as the work attachment of English 
proficient women strengthened.  Additionally, women in the LPS enjoyed increasing returns to 
their educational attainment after legalization, while their native Hispanic counterparts 
experienced a slight decline in the returns to additional years of schooling.  Among men, we find 
that skill variables do not help explain the employment status of immigrant men before or after 
legalization.  Yet, as their female counterparts, newly legalized men were better compensated for 
their educational attainment, while the wage returns to educational attainment among native 
Hispanic men declined in the post-IRCA period.  Furthermore, newly legalized men enjoyed a 
higher return to their work experience after legalization, while the returns to work experience 
previously enjoyed by their Hispanic native counterparts disappeared by 1992.     
  In sum, although available data do not permit us to eliminate competing explanations 
entirely, our results suggest that the well-being of skilled immigrants may have improved via 
greater employment attachment among English proficient women and higher wages for employed 
men and women –possibly owing to a higher return to their educational attainment and, in the 
case of men, to their work experience.
11   For the less skilled, increased eligibility for social 
                                                 
11 In this regard, Powers et al. (1998) document how most unauthorized immigrants found better jobs post IRCA than 
the ones they had secured upon arrival to the country.     22
services may have resulted in a reduction in labor force participation.  Indeed, while we are 
unable to assess changes in the usage of public services using the LPS, we find partial evidence of 
these transitions.  Among men, transitions into unemployment increased post-legalization, 
perhaps owing to their new eligibility for unemployment insurance.  Likewise, transitions out of 
the workforce increased among female immigrants less proficient in English more likely to 
qualify for public services.  Overall, amnesty may have improved labor market efficiency by 
increasing transparency, job mobility and the quality of job matches for some, while also reducing 
labor market participation of others.     23
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Table 1 
Labor Market Outcomes for LPS and NLSY79 Samples in 1987 and 1992 
MEN 
Panel A: Employed 
  1987 1992  ∆ (1992-1987) 
LPS  0.961 (0.193)  0.894 (0.308)  -0.067 (0.013)
*** 
NLSY  0.871 (0.336)  0.846 (0.361)  -0.021 (0.021)
Diff-in-diff -  -  -0.046 (0.024)
*
Panel B: Unemployed 
  1987 1992  ∆ (1992-1987) 
LPS  0.014 (0.120)  0.065 (0.246)  0.050 (0.010)
*** 
NLSY  0.056 (0.229)  0.079 (0.271)  0.024 (0.015)
Diff-in-diff -  -  0.026 (0.018)
*
Panel C: Not in the Labor Force 
  1987 1992  ∆ (1992-1987) 
LPS  0.024 (0.154)  0.041 (0.199)  0.017 (0.009)
* 
NLSY  0.074 (0.261)  0.074 (0.263)  0.001 (0.015)
Diff-in-diff -  -  0.016 (0.018) 
WOMEN 
Panel D: Employed 
  1987 1992  ∆ (1992-1987) 
LPS  0.735 (0.442)  0.656 (0.475)  -0.079 (0.027)
*** 
NLSY  0.687 (0.464)  0.682 (0.466)  -0.005 (0.027)
Diff-in-diff -  -  -0.074 (0.038)
*
Panel E: Unemployed 
  1987 1992  ∆ (1992-1987) 
LPS  0.035 (0.185)  0.057 (0.232)  0.022 (0.013)
* 
NLSY  0.056 (0.231)  0.070 (0.256)  0.014 (0.014)
Diff-in-diff -  -  0.008 (0.020)
Panel F: Not in the Labor Force 
  1987 1992  ∆ (1992-1987) 
LPS  0.229 (0.421)  0.287 (0.453)  0.057 (0.026) 
NLSY  0.256 (0.437)  0.247 (0.432)  -0.009 (0.025)
Diff-in-diff -  -  0.066 (0.036)
* 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level or 
better, **signifies statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level or better and *signifies statistically different 
from zero at the 10 percent level or better. 27 
Table 2A 
Probit Estimates of the Effect of Legalization on Male Labor Market Outcomes 
Dependent Variable  Employed  Unemployed  Not in the Labor Force 
Independent Variables  Coeff.  S.E.  M.E.  Coeff. S.E.  M.E.  Coeff. S.E.  M.E. 
Age  -0.013 0.018  -0.002  -0.007 0.022 -0.001  0.028 0.023 0.002 
Married  0.464***  0.080 0.078 -0.347***  0.095 -0.032 -0.434***  0.095 -0.042 
Family Size  -0.061***  0.017  -0.009  0.031  0.021  0.003  0.071***  0.021  0.006 
Mexican  -0.079 0.086  -0.012 0.230**  0.104 0.019  -0.083 0.104 -0.007 
Education  0.000 0.019  0.000  -0.020 0.025 -0.002  0.009 0.023 0.001 
U.S. Education  0.181  0.154  0.028  -0.266 0.208 -0.023  -0.043 0.184 -0.004 
English Proficient  0.017  0.101  0.003  -0.017 0.119 -0.001  -0.028 0.131 -0.003 
Years of Experience  -0.018  0.022  -0.003  0.027  0.027  0.002  0.007  0.026  0.001 
South  -0.017 0.140  -0.003  0.007 0.160 0.001  0.016 0.181 0.001 
West  -0.106 0.118  -0.017  0.045 0.136 0.004  0.130 0.153 0.011 
North  East  -0.326**  0.148  -0.060 0.379**  0.169 0.042  0.178 0.179 0.018 
Post Legalization  -0.795**  0.377 -0.127  0.388  0.532  0.034  0.871* 0.449  0.081 
LPS  0.714***  0.178 0.123 -0.807***  0.263 -0.082  -0.499**  0.208 -0.048 
LPS*Post Legalization  -0.355*  0.148  -0.061 0.539**  0.211 0.057  0.132 0.187 0.012 
Education*Post  Legalization  0.021 0.022  0.003  0.012 0.028 0.001  -0.037 0.027 -0.003 
Years of Experience*Post Legalization  0.044*  0.023 0.007  -0.034 0.032 -0.003  -0.046* 0.027 -0.004 
Number of Observations  2782  2782  2782 
      
Wald Chi2(16)  103.45  56.63  53.12 
Prob > Chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Log Likelihood  -845.193  -524.050  -515.900 
Notes:  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level or better, **signifies statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level or 
better and *signifies statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level or better.  The regressions include a constant. 
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Table 2B 
Probit Estimates of the Effect of Legalization on Female Labor Market Outcomes
Dependent Variable  Employed  Unemployed  Not in the Labor Force 
Independent Variables  Coeff.  S.E.  M.E.  Coeff. S.E.  M.E.  Coeff. S.E.  M.E. 
Age  -0.008 0.014  -0.003  0.003 0.019 0.000  0.007 0.014 0.002 
Married  -0.107 0.068  -0.037 -0.231**  0.096 -0.025 0.214***  0.069 0.066 
Family Size  -0.099***  0.018  -0.035  0.030  0.025  0.003  0.099***  0.017  0.031 
Mexican  -0.021 0.071  -0.007 0.217**  0.105 0.022  -0.049 0.072 -0.015 
Education  0.057***  0.014 0.020  -0.039*  0.022 -0.004 -0.052***  0.015 -0.016 
U.S. Education  -0.097  0.140  -0.034  -0.136 0.219 -0.014  0.162 0.144 0.050 
English Proficient  0.152*  0.085  0.054  0.093  0.138  0.009  -0.203**  0.092  -0.065 
Years of Experience  0.020  0.015  0.007  0.004  0.021  0.000  -0.023  0.015  -0.007 
South  0.185* 0.107 0.062  -0.160 0.148 -0.015  -0.151 0.113 -0.046 
West  0.040 0.093 0.014  -0.016 0.129 -0.002  -0.041 0.098 -0.013 
North  East  -0.181 0.130  -0.065  0.261 0.183 0.032  0.105 0.136 0.034 
Post  Legalization  -0.029 0.285  -0.010  -0.315 0.430 -0.033  0.128 0.300 0.040 
LPS 0.446***  0.154  0.154  -0.427*  0.243  -0.044  -0.362**  0.159  -0.112 
LPS*Post Legalization  -0.298**  0.117  -0.107  0.291  0.208  0.034  0.244**  0.123  0.080 
Education*Post  Legalization  -0.023 0.016  -0.008  0.042 0.028 0.004  0.011 0.017 0.003 
Years of Experience*Post Legalization  0.025  0.017  0.009  -0.011  0.027  -0.001  -0.023  0.018  -0.007 
Number of Observations  2333  2333  2333 
      
Wald Chi2(16)  120.35  120.35  123.77 
Prob > Chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes:  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level or better, **signifies statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level or 
better and *signifies statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level or better.  The regressions include a constant.  The regional reference 
category is North Central.  29 
 
Table 3A 
The Role of Returns to Human Capital as Determinants of Male Employment and Unemployment Statuses 
Independent Variables 
LPS NLSY79 
1987 1992 1987  1992 
Coeff. S.E.  M.E.  Coeff. S.E. M.E. Coeff. S.E. M.E. Coeff. S.E. M.E. 
Employed 
English Proficient  -0.145 0.203  -0.012  0.176 0.126  0.031  - -  - - - - 
U.S. Education  0.333 0.280  0.022  0.188 0.197  0.030  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Education -0.046  0.027  -0.004  -0.009  0.016  -0.002  0.080***  0.032 0.018  0.111***  0.032 0.028 
Years of Experience  -0.017 0.039  -0.001  0.040 0.032  0.007 -1.37e-04  0.029  -3.1e-05 0.026  0.024 0.007 
Number of Observations  759  804  557  592 
Regression Fit Statistics   
LR Chi2(10)  8.52  12.27  38.89  62.55 
Prob > Chi2  0.578  0.344  0.000  0.000 
  Unemployed 
English Proficient  0.242 0.281  0.008  -0.164 0.146  -0.019  - -  - - - - 
U.S. Education  -0.170 0.407  -0.005  -0.305 0.248  -0.031  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Education  0.011 0.037 3.68e-04 -0.002 0.019  2.32e-04 -0.070  0.044 -0.006  -0.042  0.036 -0.005 
Years of Experience  0.029 0.054 9.56e-04 -0.015 0.037  -0.002  0.034  0.040  0.003  -0.008  0.029 -0.001 
Number of Observations  759  804  557  535 
Regression Fit Statistics   
LR Chi2(10)  6.12  7.92  25.60  592 
Prob > Chi2  0.805  0.721  0.002  0.001 
Notes:  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level or better, **signifies statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level or better and 
*signifies statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level or better.  The regressions include a constant, information on respondents’ age, marital status, family size, 






The Role of Returns to Human Capital as Determinants of Female Employment and Unemployment Statuses 
Independent Variables 
LPS NLSY79 
1987 1992  1987  1992 
Coeff. S.E. M.E.  Coeff. S.E. M.E.  Coeff. S.E.  M.E. Coeff.  S.E.  M.E. 
Employed 
English Proficient  0.124 0.133 0.039  0.276**  0.124 0.098  - -  - - - - 
U.S. Education  -0.112  0.186  -0.039  0.015  0.175  0.006  - -  - - -  - 
Education  0.038**  0.019 0.012 0.004 0.016 0.002  0.094***  0.029 0.037  0.103***  0.027 0.041 
Years of Experience  0.015 0.023 0.005 0.002 0.024 0.001  0.016  0.022 0.007  0.068***  0.018 0.027 
Number of Observations  593  544  585  611 
Regression Fit Statistics   
LR Chi2(11)  49.10  24,68  44.37  51,71 
Prob > Chi2  0.000  0.010  0.000  0.000 
  Not in the Labor Force 
English Proficient  -0.147 0.139 -0.042  -0.347
***  0.130 -0.112  - -  - - - - 
U.S. Education  0.151  0.192  0.045  0.087  0.181  0.030  - -  - - -  - 
Education  -0.023 0.019 -0.007 -0.008 0.017 -0.003  -0.082**  0.030 -0.032  -0.118
***  0.029 -0.046 
Years of Experience  -0.011 0.023 -0.003  -0.002 0.024 -0.001 -0.026  0.023 -0.010  -0.065
***  0.019 -0.026 
Number of Observations  593  544  585  611 
Regression Fit Statistics   
LR Chi2(20)  51,25  30.62  35.45  56.67 
Prob > Chi2  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 
Notes:  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level or better, **signifies statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level or better and 
*signifies statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level or better.  The regressions include a constant, information on respondents’ age, marital status, family size, 




Wages (1987-1992): Legalized Population Survey (LPS) vs. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) 
MEN 
Panel A: Log Real Hourly Wages 
  1987 1992  ∆ (1992-1987) 
LPS  2.020 (0.393)  2.086 (0.388)  0.067 (0.021)
*** 
NLSY  2.177 (0.450)  2.219 (0.430)  0.042 (0.028)
Diff-in-diff -  -  0.025 (0.035)
WOMEN 
Panel A: Log Real Hourly Wages 
  1987 1992  ∆ (1992-1987) 
LPS  1.791 (0.370)  1.891 (0.384)  0.100 (0.028)
*** 
NLSY  2.047 (0.441)  2.094 (0.454)  0.048 (0.030)
Diff-in-diff -  -  0.053 (0.041)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level or 
better, **signifies statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level or better and *signifies statistically different 
from zero at the 10 percent level or better. 
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Table 5 
Wage Growth Estimates for Respondents Working in 1987 and in 1992  
Group  MEN WOMEN 
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Age  -0.009 0.007 -0.010 0.009 
Mexican 0.015  0.028  -0.046  0.038 
Education -0.001  0.004  0.006  0.006 
U.S. Education   0.023  0.052  0.074  0.082 
English Proficient  0.054*  0.034  0.026  0.051 
Years of Experience  -0.003  0.005  -0.004  0.008 
Agriculture & Mining  -0.048  0.060  -0.075  0.145 
Construction 0.019  0.044  -0.250  0.323 
Manufacturing 0.014  0.033  0.010  0.050 
TCPU 0.056  0.054  0.067  0.107 
FIRE -0.007  0.083  0.024  0.076 
Business Services  0.076  0.054  -0.033  0.080 
Personal Services  -0.143**  0.074  -0.001  0.066 
Recreational Services  -0.035  0.132  -0.245**  0.106 
Professional Services  0.137**  0.059  0.043  0.057 
Public Administration  0.049  0.069  0.205**  0.093 
South -0.052  0.041  0.090*  0.051 
West -0.006  0.032  0.032  0.042 
North East  0.002  0.061  0.005  0.070 
LPS  0.104** 0.053 0.189** 0.089 
Number of Observations  923  521 
Regression Fit Statistics 
F(20, Number of Observations)  1.47  1.45 
Prob > F  0.082  0.093 
Notes:  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level or 
better, **signifies statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level or better 
and *signifies statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level or better.  The 
regressions include a constant.  North Central and Wholesale and Retail Trade are 























Notes:  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level or better, **signifies statistically different from zero at the 5 
percent level or better and *signifies statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level or better.  The employment and wage equations 
include a constant, information on respondents’ age, Mexican ethnicity and region of residence in the U.S.  The main equation also includes 
information on the industry of employment.  For identification purposes, only the employment selection equation includes information on 
marital status and family size.   
 
Table 6 
The Role of Returns to Human Capital as Determinants of Male and Female Log Hourly Wages 
Independent Variables 
LPS NLSY79 
1987 1992 1987 1992 
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
MEN 
English  Proficient 0.100***  0.030  0.010  0.028  - - - - 
U.S.  Education  -0.018  0.039  0.081**  0.040  - - - - 
Education  0.015*** 0.004 0.019*** 0.004 0.059*** 0.010 0.044*** 0.009 
Years  of  Experience  0.014**  0.006 0.023*** 0.007 0.033*** 0.009  0.012  0.008 
Number of Observations  766  664  436  422 
F(19, obs.)  9.20  10.73  8.35  6.16 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  WOMEN 
English  Proficient 0.101***  0.039  -0.008  0.040  - - - - 
U.S.  Education  -0.028  0.055  0.044  0.055  - - - - 
Education  0.022*** 0.005 0.029*** 0.005 0.096*** 0.011 0.084*** 0.011 
Years  of  Experience  0.005 0.007 0.008 0.008  0.014*  0.009 0.004 0.008 
Number of Observations  406  332  349  370 
F(19, obs.)  5.07  6.88  8.99  6.66 




Definitions of Variables in Our Samples 
Variables LPS  NLSY79 
Age  Respondent’s age  Respondent’s age 
Married Currently  married Currently  married 
Family Size  Number of people in the family  Number of people in the family 
Mexican Mexican  dummy Mexican  dummy 
Education  Years of Schooling   Years of Schooling  
U.S. Education   Equals 1 if they have taken English classes, 
excluding the 40 hours of English courses you 
may have taken to qualify for permanent 
residence. 
Equals 1 for NLSY79 respondents 
English Proficient   Can do all the following tasks: read newspapers, 
magazines, or recipes written in English and to 
speak English with sales clerks, doctors, nurses, 
teachers as well as on the telephone. 
Equals 1 for NLSY79 respondents. 
Years of Experience  Years of U.S. work experience  Years of U.S. work experience 
Agriculture & Mining  Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries and Mining  Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries and Mining 
Construction Construction  Construction
Manufacturing Manufacturing    Manufacturing  
TCPU  Transportation, Communication, Public Utilities Transportation, Communication, Public Utilities
FIRE  Finance, insurance and real estate Finance, insurance and real estate
Business Services  Business and repair services Business and repair services 
Personal Services  Personal services  Personal services 
Recreational Services  Entertainment and recreation services Entertainment and recreation services
Professional Services  Professional and related services Professional and related services
Public Administration  Public Administration Public Administration 
Trade  Wholesale and retail trade Wholesale and retail trade 
South  Job located in Texas  Census Region (including TX) 
West  Job located in California  Census Region (including CA) 
North East  Job located in New York  Census Region (including NY) 
North Central  Job located in Illinois  Census Region (including IL) 
Log Hourly Wage  Weekly (pay/hours worked) in 1992 dollars  Hourly rate of pay in 1992 dollars 
Employed  Employed during the previous week  Employed during the survey week 
Unemployed  Unemployed during the previous week  Unemployed during the previous week 
Not in the Labor Force  Not in the labor force during the previous week  Not in the labor force during the previous week 
  
35   
 
Table B 
Male Means and Standard Deviations 
Sample LPS  NLSY79 
Time Periods  Pre-Legalization  Post-Legalization Pre-Legalization Post-Legalization 
Descriptive  Statistic  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
For All Respondents:          
Age  26.69 2.25 31.69 2.25 26.81 2.19 30.75 2.19 
Married  0.59 0.49 0.76 0.42 0.45 0.50 0.53 0.50 
Family  Size  3.49 2.06 4.27 2.30 3.25 1.92 3.31 1.72 
Mexican  0.57 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.57 0.50 
Education  9.15 3.89 9.65 4.37  12.09  2.19  12.27  2.34 
U.S.  Education    0.14 0.34 0.14 0.34 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
English  Proficient  0.58 0.49 0.45 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Years  of  Experience  7.29 2.27  12.29  2.27 7.47 2.77  11.47  2.77 
South  0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47 
West  0.57 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.50 
North  East  0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37 
North  Central  0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 
Employed  0.96 0.19 0.89 0.31 0.87 0.34 0.85 0.36 
Unemployed  0.01 0.12 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.27 
Not  in  the  Labor  Force  0.02 0.15 0.04 0.20 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 
For Working Respondents: 
        
Log  Hourly  Wage  2.00 0.37 2.09 0.38 2.19 0.44 2.23 0.43 
Agriculture  &  Mining  0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.23 
Construction  0.13 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28 
Manufacturing  0.30 0.46 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 
TCPU  0.03 0.18 0.05 0.23 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 
FIRE  0.02 0.14 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.16 
Business  Services  0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 
Personal  Services  0.04 0.21 0.07 0.26 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.17 
Recreational  Services  0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.11 
Professional  Services  0.02 0.14 0.03 0.17 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 
Public  Administration  0.00 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.28 
Trade  0.29 0.46 0.29 0.45 0.22 0.42 0.19 0.39 





Female Means and Standard Deviations 
Sample LPS  NLSY79 
Time Periods  Pre-Legalization  Post-Legalization Pre-Legalization Post-Legalization 
Descriptive  Statistic  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
For All Respondents:          
Age  27.04 2.17 32.04 2.17 26.81 2.27 30.75 2.28 
Married  0.66 0.47 0.76 0.43 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.50 
Family  Size  3.87 1.89 4.49 1.97 3.51 1.77 3.61 1.66 
Mexican  0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.57 0.50 
Education  8.70 3.81 9.26 4.15  12.43  2.03  12.63  2.14 
U.S.  Education    0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
English  Proficient  0.48 0.50 0.37 0.48 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Years  of  Experience  6.88 2.54  11.88  2.54 7.26 2.91  11.26  2.91 
South  0.14 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47 
West  0.59 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.42 0.49 
North  East  0.08 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.17 0.37 0.16 0.36 
North  Central  0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 
Employed  0.73 0.44 0.66 0.47 0.69 0.46 0.69 0.46 
Unemployed  0.04 0.19 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26 
Not  in  the  Labor  Force  0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42 
For Working Respondents:          
Log  Hourly  Wage  1.78 0.36 1.92 0.39 2.10 0.43 2.18 0.42 
Agriculture  &  Mining  0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.14 
Construction  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.08 
Manufacturing  0.31 0.46 0.26 0.44 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.33 
TCPU  0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.24 
FIRE  0.02 0.14 0.04 0.19 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 
Business  Services  0.06 0.24 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19 
Personal  Services  0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.20 
Recreational  Services  0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.11 
Professional  Services  0.10 0.30 0.14 0.35 0.28 0.45 0.32 0.47 
Public  Administration  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.31 0.05 0.22 
Trade  0.21 0.41 0.26 0.44 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.39 
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Illustration of the Impact of Legalization on Employment 
 



























Note:  Dotted lines represent the budget constraint prior to Legalization.  Solid lines represent the budget constraint 
post Legalization.  
 












Note:  Dotted lines represent the budget constraint prior to Legalization.  Solid lines represent the budget constraint 











Disposable Income  Disposable Income 
Non-Market Time  Non-Market Time 
1
2  2